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What If the NCAA Was a State Actor?
Here, There, and Beyond
Terri Peretti*

In 1988, in NCAA v. Tarkanian, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) was not a state actor and, thus, did not have to abide by
constitutional requirements, such as due process of law.1 This
simple, but controversial, ruling has had enormous consequences.
By ignoring the interdependencies of money and power between
the Association and public universities, the Court has shielded the
NCAA from judicial review and left the liberty and property
interests of college athletes and coaches unprotected. Those
interests are not insignificant. Because of NCAA actions, college
athletes may lose their eligibility to compete, scholarships, and
access to an exclusive path to a professional sports career.2
Because of NCAA actions, coaches may lose their jobs and
salaries, and their future career opportunities may be restricted.3
* Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University. Comments and
questions can be sent to the author at tperetti@scu.edu.
1. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Dan Kane, U.S. Senate hearing on college athletics will
feature former UNC athlete, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 8, 2014),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/07/08/3992293/us-senate-hearing-oncollege-athletics.html; Tim Keown, Jamar Samuels and the NCAA follies,
ESPN (Mar. 21, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/
keown-120320/jamar-samuels-suspension-kansas-state-tournament-game-mo
re-ncaa-hypocrisy; Jake Trotter, Banned OU football player Mike Balogun
breaks silence, NEWSOK (Mar. 10, 2010, 8:35 AM), http://newsok.com/
banned-ou-football-player-mike-balogun-breaks-silence/article/3445203.
3. See, e.g., Gary Klein, Ex-USC assistant Todd McNair seeks
vindication from Reggie Bush saga, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2014, 5:37 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/usc/la-sp-usc-ncaa-mcnair-20140609-story.htm
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Because of NCAA actions, athletic programs may lose millions of
dollars.4
The Association’s investigatory and enforcement
proceedings that generate these results have been likened to
“kangaroo courts.”5 As long as Tarkanian stands as good law,
however, the NCAA is free to offer as much, or as little,
substantive and procedural fairness as it chooses, and those
subject to its investigations and sanctions will have no judicial
recourse under the Constitution.
This Article examines several questions regarding this
controversial and highly consequential decision.
First, was
Tarkanian wrongly decided? Second, what would its reversal
require—doctrinally, politically, and strategically? Third, what
consequences would likely follow?
Before addressing these questions, Parts I and II of this
Article describe the state action doctrine and the Tarkanian case,
respectively. Part III observes several weaknesses in the Court’s
l (former running back coach for the University of Southern California, Todd
McNair); Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, Standing Up To the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES,
March 24, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/24/opinion/nocera-standing-up-to-the-ncaa.html
(former
head
basketball coach for the State University of New York, Buffalo, Tim Cohane).
4. See, e.g., Steve Eder & Mac Tracy, N.C.A.A. Decides to Roll Back
Sanctions against Penn State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2014, at B12. The most
notorious example involves Penn State, which was sanctioned in the wake of
Jerry Sandusky’s child sexual abuse conviction. Id. The NCAA fined Penn
State $60 million, imposed a four-year ban on post-season play, reduced
scholarships, and vacated all of its 1998 to 2011 accolades. Id. The NCAA
later eased some of these sanctions. Id.
5. See Kerry Eggers, On Adelman’s wife, NCAA’s Kangaroo Court, late
Pac-12 Hoop starts and much more, PORTLAND TRIBUNE (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:00
AM),
http://portlandtribune.com/pt/12-sports/127132-on-adelmans-wifealdridge-ncaas-kangaroo-court-late-pac-12-hoop-starts-and-much-more;
Ali
Fogarty, Legislators Introduce NCAA Accountability Act, ONWARD STATE
(Aug. 2, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://onwardstate.com/2013/08/02/legislatorsintroduce-ncaa-accountability-act/; Barry Petchesky, A Miami Player Filed a
Police Report Over the NCAA’s “Intimidation,” DEADSPIN (June 4, 2013, 10:58
AM), http://deadspin.com/a-miami-player-filed-a-police-report-over-the-ncaasi-511200084; Carter Williams, How handling Penn State made the NCAA
Look foolish again, SUU NEWS (July 23, 2012), http://www.suunews.com/
weblogs/monday-morning-quarterback/2012/jul/23/how-handling-penn-statemade-the-ncaa-look-foolish/. New York Times columnist Joe Nocera has
employed the “Star Chamber” label in describing the NCAA’s justice system.
See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, N.C.A.A.’s ‘Justice’ System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012,
at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/-ncaasjustice-system.html.
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analysis and concludes that Tarkanian should indeed be reversed.
Part IV discusses the doctrinal considerations in Tarkanian’s
reversal, observing that the distance “from here to there” is
small—in part due to the Court’s rediscovery of the “entwinement”
standard which it used in 2001 to find that a high school athletic
association was a state actor.6
While overturning the 5-4
Tarkanian decision would require little doctrinal change and only
a single vote, the impetus for reversal must nonetheless be
political, as Part V argues. Evidence regarding doctrinal change
in the fields of reapportionment, the Second Amendment, and
state action itself suggests that social and political movements are
critical ingredients for constitutional change. This is a valuable
lesson for reformers seeking to subject the NCAA to judicial
oversight. Part VI explores several strategic factors in securing
Tarkanian’s reversal, including emphasizing the disparate racial
impact of NCAA policies and sanctions; taking advantage of an
increasingly tarnished NCAA image as it faces multiple lawsuits
and growing media and congressional criticism; and electing more
Democrats, especially to the White House and Senate, to help shift
the judiciary in a leftward direction. Part VII concludes by
discussing the implications of the Supreme Court overturning
Tarkanian and finding that the NCAA is a state actor.
I.

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

Since 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases,7 the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Fourteenth Amendment only restricts
state action, not private action.8 The apparent simplicity of this
6. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531
U.S. 288, 290–91 (2001).
7. United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 11
(1883).
8. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1961). At the simplest
level, only statutes enacted by a governmental body or the actions of
government officials qualify as state action, while conduct by private citizens
or organizations is regarded as private action. The problem is that these are
not mutually exclusive categories into which all conduct can be easily placed.
Rather, they are endpoints on a continuum. Between purely private and
purely governmental action is a range of mixed or hybrid activities. For
example, there may be government involvement in or encouragement of
private action, which effectively transforms it into state action for purposes of
applying constitutional restrictions. Finding a persuasive and coherent
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rule is deceiving. The Court has itself acknowledged that the
question of whether conduct is public or private “frequently
admits of no easy answer,”9 with “the nonobvious involvement of
the State in private conduct” often discernible only by “sifting
facts and weighing circumstances” on a case-by-case basis.10 It
has, nonetheless, offered some doctrinal guidance with the nexus
and public function approaches, each providing an exception to the
general state action rule that private actors are not subject to
constitutional limitations.
Under the “nexus” or “entanglement” branch, a private actor
will be treated as a state actor if there is “significant state
involvement” in the private activity.11 Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority12 is emblematic. There, the Court found a
symbiotic relationship between Eagle Coffee Shoppe and the
Wilmington, Delaware Parking Authority.13 The restaurant,
which refused to serve African-American customers, leased its
property from the state, operated out of a public parking garage
that was maintained by the state and which flew government
flags overhead, and received a steady stream of customers who
enjoyed convenient parking.14 The state, on the other hand,
profited from Eagle’s discrimination by collecting rent, which
enabled the garage to be financially self-sustaining.15 These
interdependencies led the Court to view the state as a “joint
participant” in Eagle’s race discrimination and, thus, to find that
Eagle Coffee Shoppe was a state actor for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.16
The public function theory identifies another exception to the
general principle that private actors need not comply with

method for judging those “gray areas” is the challenge of the state action
doctrine.
9. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 172.
10. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
11. See Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190–91 (1970)); Burton, 365 U.S.
at 725; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1948).
12. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723–25.
13. Id. at 725.
14. Id. at 716.
15. Id. at 723–24.
16. Id. at 725.
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constitutional requirements.17 Here, a private actor becomes a
state actor if it performs a public or governmental function.18 The
underlying rationale is that the state cannot escape the reach of
the Constitution by delegating its functions to private actors.19
For example, the Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright that, because
the Democratic Party performed important electoral functions
delegated to it by the state (in this case, the state of Texas), it was
indeed a state actor.20 Therefore, it could not exclude African
Americans from participating in its primary elections.21
A notable feature of this doctrinal area is considerable change
in the Court’s willingness to accept state action claims. In the
mid-twentieth century, it used the nexus and public function
approaches to expand the notion of state action and permitted the
Constitution to reach and restrict more and more private conduct,
as exemplified by Burton and Smith.22 As Table 1 indicates, the
Court found state action in all of the leading cases decided in the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.23 A dramatic change followed in the
next two decades, with the Court developing a more restrictive
interpretation of the public function and nexus theories and
limiting the Constitution’s reach into the private sector.24 By
1982, instead of a private actor needing only to perform a public
function, the function now had to be one that was “traditionally
17. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).
18. See, e.g., Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502–03, 508–09 (holding that residents
did not lose their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights (in this case, the
right to distribute religious literature on a town sidewalk) simply because the
town was owned by a private entity).
19. See, e.g., Terry, 345 U.S. at 469; Smith, 321 U.S. at 664.
20. 321 U.S. at 657, 664–65.
21. Id. at 664.
22. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961);
Smith, 321 U.S. at 664.
23. See infra Table 1.
24. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnegabo Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 201 (1989); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194–96 (1988); S.F. Arts
& Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546–47 (1987); RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–43 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1003 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976); Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345,
350–51 (1974); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 119 (1973); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972); Lloyd
Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
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the exclusive prerogative of the State.”25 The bar for finding state
action was similarly raised with respect to the nexus approach.
Mere entanglements between the state and the private entity,
including significant financial support, would no longer suffice.26
Instead, the state was required to compel or coerce the private
action.27

25. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
26. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351.
27. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004–05. An explanation of both the
Court’s liberal expansion of state action rules and its subsequent
conservative contraction of those rules is described briefly below on page 297307 of this Article and more fully in Terri Peretti, Constructing the State
Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 298–303 (2010).
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Table 1: Leading State Action Cases, 1940–198928
1940s
US v. Classic (1941)
Smith v. Allwright (1944)
Marsh v. Alabama (1946)
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
1950s
PUC v. Pollak (1952)
Barrows v. Jackson (1953)
Terry v. Adams (1953)
Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of Trusts (1957)
1960s
Burton v. WPA (1961)
Peterson v. Greenville (1963)
Lombard v. Louisiana (1963)
Evans v. Newton (1966)
Reitman v. Mulkey (1967)
Amalgamated v. Logan Valley (1968)
1970s
Evans v. Abney (1970)
Moose Lodge v. Irvis (1972)
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972)
Norwood v. Harrison (1973)
CBS v. DNC (1973)
Gilmore v. Montgomery (1974)
Jackson v. Metro Edison (1974)
Hudgens v. NLRB (1976)
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks (1978)
1980s
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil (1982)
Blum v. Yaretsky (1982)
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn (1982)
S.F. Arts & Athletics v. USOC (1987)
NCAA v. Tarkanian (1988)
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty DSS (1989)

State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
State Action
No State Action
No State Action
State Action
No State Action
State Action
No State Action
No State Action
No State Action
State Action
No State Action
No State Action
No State Action
No State Action
No State Action

28. Peretti, supra note 27, at 282 (Wiley) (“This Web site and any Wiley
publications and material which may be accessed from it are protected by
copyright. Nothing on this Web site or in the Wiley publications and material
may be downloaded, reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, modified, made
available on a network, used to create derivative works, or transmitted in any
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Blum v. Yaretsky29 effectively illustrates these changes. The
decision of a private nursing home to discharge or transfer
patients without notice or the opportunity for a hearing was
challenged as state action that violated constitutional
requirements of due process.30 The Court rejected the argument
that the government was a “joint participant” due to its extensive
regulation and substantial financial support of the nursing home,
including its reimbursement of over ninety percent of patients’
medical expenses.31 Furthermore, the Court observed that the
state neither dictated nor coerced the challenged action and that
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
scanning, or otherwise, except (i) in the United States, as permitted under
Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, or
internationally, as permitted by other applicable national copyright laws, or
(ii) as expressly authorized on this Web site, or (iii) that a reasonable amount
of material may be cached and stored by search engines indexing this Web
site, or (iv) with the prior written permission of Wiley. Requests to the
Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Rights & Permissions
Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, MS 4-02, Hoboken,
New Jersey, 07030-5774, USA or email PermissionsUS@wiley.com. The
licenses set forth in (ii) and (iii) above may be revoked by Wiley on notice. The
statements and opinions in the material contained on this Web site and any
Wiley publications and material which may be accessed from this Web site
are those of the individual contributors or advertisers, as indicated. Wiley
has used reasonable care and skill in compiling the content of this Web site.
However, Wiley, its employees, and content providers make no warranty as to
the accuracy or completeness of any information on this Web site and accept
no responsibility or liability for any inaccuracy or errors and omissions, or for
any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the accessing or
use of any files, software and other materials , instructions, methods or ideas
contained on this Web site or in the Wiley publications and material accessed
from it. Any third party Web sites which may be accessed through this Web
site are the sole responsibility of the third party who is posting the Web site.
Wiley makes no warranty as to the accuracy of any information on third
party Web sites and accepts no liability for any errors and omissions or for
any damage or injury to persons or property arising out of the use or
operation of any materials, instructions, methods or ideas contained on such
Web sites. ALL DOWNLOADABLE SOFTWARE AND FILES ARE
DISTRIBUTED ON AN ‘AS IS’ BASIS WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF ANY
KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATIONS,
WARRANTIES
OF
TITLE
OR
IMPLIED
WARRANTIES
OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND
DOWNLOADING AND/OR USING THE SOFTWARE AND FILES IS AT
THE USER’S SOLE RISK.”).
29. 457 U.S. at 1003.
30. Id. at 995–96.
31. Id. at 1010–11.
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nursing home care was not “traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state.”32
Other state action cases that were decided around this time
period, including Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,33 Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.,34 and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,35 illustrate the
Court’s newly restrictive application of the public function and
nexus approaches. As will next be discussed, these decisions and
the higher hurdle they established for a finding of state action
proved to be quite advantageous to the NCAA, aiding its legal
victory in the 1988 Tarkanian case. The NCAA was, to put it
simply, very lucky in its timing.
II. NCAA V. TARKANIAN

The NCAA is a private, non-profit association founded in 1906
to establish uniform rules for intercollegiate sports.36 Its creation
was in response to growing concerns—including those voiced by
President Theodore Roosevelt—over violence and player injuries
in college football.37 Today, the NCAA consists of almost 1,300
members, including nearly every four-year public and private
American university and college with a major athletic program.38
In 2013, it earned revenues of over $900 million with net assets of
32. Id. at 1011–12 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974)).
33. 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that there was not a sufficient nexus
between the state and a privately owned and operated utility company that
had been issued a public certificate of convenience, giving it a partial
monopoly to render its actions as state actions).
34. 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that a statutory system that allowed
state officials to attach privately owned property based on one party’s ex
parte application displayed a sufficient nexus to render the attachment as a
state action).
35. 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private school performing a
traditionally public function was not a state actor solely based on the receipt
of public funds since the school was not compelled by state regulations).
36. See JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY iii
(2006); Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic
Assocation’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 9, 12 (2000).
37. See Smith, supra note 36, at 11–12.
38. See, e.g., Turner introduce new NCAA.com, NCAA (Oct. 31, 2013,
12:37 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2013-10-31/ncaaturnerintroduce-new-ncaacom. In 1988, when the Supreme Court decided NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988), the Association only consisted of 960
member universities and colleges.
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over $625 million, and its workforce currently consists of 500
employees.39 As the primary governing body for college sports,
the NCAA has developed a complex set of rules that regulate
recruiting and financial aid relating to college athletes.40 Most of
these rules are designed to enforce “the amateur code” and
preserve the “student-athlete” concept, which has protected the
NCAA against workmen’s compensation claims by college athletes
and which most experts regard as an antitrust violation.41 The
NCAA’s rules gained authority as the Association’s economic
power grew, primarily due to its role in securing lucrative
television contracts which has transformed it into “the gatekeeper
39. See Mark Alesia, NCAA approaching $1 billion per year amid
challenges by players, INDY STAR (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:06 PM), http://www
.indystar.com/story/news/2014/03/27/ncaa-approaching-billion-per-year-amidchallenges-players/6973767/.
40. See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL arts. 13, 15, at 87–
145, 187–209 (2014), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D115.pdf [hereinafter D-1 MANUAL].
41. See Jason Belzer, Op-Ed., Leveling The Playing Field: Student
Athletes Or Employee Athletes?, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 2:00 P.M.),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2013/09/09/leveling-the-playing-fieldstudent-athletes-or-employee-athletes/; see also D-1 MANUAL, supra note 40,
art. 12, at 57–86. The NCAA asserts that its “membership has adopted
amateurism rules to ensure the students’ priority remains on obtaining a
quality educational experience and that all of student-athletes are competing
equitably.”
Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015); see also D-1 MANUAL, supra note 40, art. 2.9, at 4. It is
well known, however, that the “student-athlete” term was adopted to protect
the NCAA and universities from workmen’s compensation claims for injured
football players. See, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 A.M.), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/?single_page=true.
A
variety of antitrust experts and sports economists believe that this agreement
among member institutions to limit compensation for college athletes violates
antitrust laws, thereby transforming the NCAA into a cartel. See generally
ARTHUR A. FLEISCHER ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR (1992); ANDREW ZIMBALIST,
UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS (1999); see also Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Ann M. Mayo, Issues in
Antitrust, the NCAA, and Sports Management, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 69, 77–
78 (1999); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2643 (1996); Stanton Wheeler, Rethinking Amateurism
and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213, 226 (2004); Roger G. Noll, The
Antitrust Economics of NCAA Restrictions on Athletic Scholarships 4, 7 (Aug.
31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://winthrop
ntelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Noll-Report-NCAA-The-Antitrus
t-Economics-of-NCAA-Restrictions-on-Athletic-Scholarships.pdf.
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of . . . the ‘entertainment Goliath.’”42 The process by which the
NCAA asserts its authority is indirect, however. Member
institutions do not grant the NCAA authority over their athletic
programs, but they do agree to follow and enforce NCAA rules.43
Thus, it is the school rather than the NCAA that takes
disciplinary action against athletes and the athletic program staff.
As previously mentioned, those sanctions can have devastating
consequences: a coach may be denied his or her position and
livelihood, and a college athlete may lose his or her eligibility, a
subsidized college education, and the opportunity for a lucrative
career in professional sports. Fighting those sanctions can also be
an exhausting and costly endeavor.44
The dominant view in the lower federal courts in the 1970s
was that the NCAA45 and high school athletic associations46 were
state actors. Judges typically observed that public institutions
comprised a large portion of the association’s membership, the
association’s regulatory control was extensive, and school
compliance with association recommendations was more coercive
than voluntary.47 As a result of these decisions, the NCAA and
equivalent associations at the high school level would need to
observe constitutional requirements like due process when
42. Kadence A. Otto & Kristal S. Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The
Entwinement and Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and
Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 243, 288 (2008) (quoting
JOHN R. GERDY, THE SUCCESSFUL COLLEGE ATHLETIC PROGRAM 31, 55 (1997)).
43. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988).
44. See, e.g., Phil Fairbanks, Judge rejects suit by former UB coach,
BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013, 7:46 P.M), http://www.buffalo
news.com/20130322/judge_rejects_suit_by_former_ub_coach.html (describing
SUNY Buffalo basketball coach Tim Cohane’s ten year legal fight with the
NCAA); Rachel George, Many taking the fight to the NCAA these days, USA
TODAY
SPORTS
(Apr.
25,
2013,
11:58
P.M.),
http://www.usa
today.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/04/25/ncaa-lawsuits-jerry-tarkanian-toddmcnair/2114469/ (detailing that Jerry Tarkanian’s twenty year battle with
the NCAA cost millions, although he was eventually awarded $2.5 million in
legal fees).
45. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th
Cir. 1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v.
NCAA , 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA,
493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Wright v. Ark. Activities Ass’n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974);
La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1968).
47. See supra notes 45–46.
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imposing sanctions against athletes, coaches, or schools.
This consensus was upended by 1982’s so-called “Blum
trilogy,” a set of three decisions decided on the same day that
established more restrictive state action rules.48 Following these
new rules, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected the claim of a Duke University tennis player that
the NCAA’s decision ruling him ineligible was state action and
held that the NCAA’s action was not reviewable in federal court.49
Following the Supreme Court’s doctrinal lead, the court ruled that
there is no state action when “the state in its regulatory or
subsidizing function does not order or cause the action complained
of” and noted that the public function of regulating collegiate
athletics “is not one traditionally reserved to the state.”50 Other
federal courts in the 1980s, with rare exceptions,51 similarly ruled
that the NCAA was not a state actor.52 Surprisingly, however,
courts continued to rule that high school athletic associations were
state actors.53
This divergence in judicial treatment of the NCAA and high
school athletic associations currently exists at the Supreme Court
level as well. In 1988, the Court found that the NCAA was not a
state actor, but in 2001 the Court ruled that the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association was a state actor.54 As will
be discussed shortly, the Court’s reasoning in the latter case
provides an opening for reformers seeking to subject the NCAA’s
policies and activities to judicial review. The primary obstacle
standing in the way of this goal is NCAA v. Tarkanian, to which
this Article now turns.
48. See Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 247. The 1982 “Blum trilogy”
consists of Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982).
49. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021–22 (4th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 1022.
51. See, e.g., McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
52. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988);
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d
953 (6th Cir. 1986); Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1984); Hawkins v.
NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
53. See e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir.
1982); Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
54. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.
288, 290–91 (2001); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988).
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The NCAA began investigating Jerry Tarkanian while he was
a basketball coach at California State University, Long Beach,
nearly two decades before the Supreme Court’s 1988 ruling.55 It
continued to scrutinize Tarkanian after his arrival at the
University of Nevada-Las Vegas (“UNLV”) in 1973, which was
already the subject of an NCAA investigation.56
Many
commentators agree that “the NCAA’s dogged pursuit of Jerry
Tarkanian appears to have been driven at least as much by
personal animus as by evidence against him or his players.”57 The
NCAA ultimately charged UNLV with thirty-eight rule violations
involving recruiting and providing aid and benefits to players; ten
of those violations implicated Coach Tarkanian.58 The NCAA
placed UNLV on probation for two years and, in an unusual move,
also asked UNLV to show cause as to why it should not face
additional penalties if it failed to suspend Tarkanian from its
program.59 UNLV President Donald Baepler ordered an internal
investigation which concluded that the NCAA’s charges lacked
merit. He nonetheless concluded that his institution could neither
withdraw from the NCAA nor risk additional sanctions, and he
reluctantly ordered the coach’s two-year suspension.60
Jerry Tarkanian sued the University, with the complaint later
being amended to include the NCAA.61 A Nevada trial court and
the Nevada Supreme Court both ruled in Tarkanian’s favor,
finding that the NCAA’s conduct was state action and that due
process guarantees had not been observed.62
The Nevada
Supreme Court reasoned that disciplining government employees

55. See BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA 111 (2012).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 114; accord JERRY TARKANIAN & DAN WETZEL, RUNNIN’ REBEL
(2005); DON YEAGER, SHARK ATTACK: JERRY TARKANIAN AND HIS BATTLE WITH
THE NCAA AND UNLV (1992). Tarkanian’s harsh criticism of the NCAA,
mostly for the selective enforcement of its recruiting rules, likely triggered
the organization’s lengthy battle with the coach.
See James Potter,
Comment, The NCAA as State Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and Due
Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1269, 1282 (2007).
58. See Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Nev. 1987), overruled
by Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179.
59. See id; see also PORTO, supra note 55, at 115.
60. See Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1347; see also Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian,
594 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 1979).
61. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1347.
62. Id. at 1349–51.
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was traditionally an exclusive prerogative of the state and that
the University’s delegation of such authority to the NCAA and the
University’s implementation of the NCAA’s recommended
sanctions rendered the two institutions joint participants in the
suspension.63 The procedures employed by the NCAA were
furthermore found to be deficient in several respects when it came
to due process, including the failure of enforcement staff to
provide written affidavits from interviewees.64
The NCAA appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari—though just barely.65 The preliminary pool
memorandum did not in fact regard the case as “worthy of cert”66
and found the state action issue to be “troubling in several
respects.”67 First, the memorandum observed that there was no
split in the lower courts, with recent circuit court decisions in
agreement that the NCAA was not a state actor.68 The law clerk
authoring the pool memorandum additionally argued that the
Nevada Supreme Court decision seemed to contradict, and in fact
failed to acknowledge, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee that
the U.S. Olympic Committee was not a state actor since “the
coordination of amateur sports has [not] been a traditional
governmental function.”69 Finally, the memorandum observed
that the state action issue presented oddly in the case.70 Instead
of the typical inquiry as to whether the state compelled the
private action, the question in Tarkanian was whether the private
actor (the NCAA) compelled the state (UNLV) to act against its
employee (Tarkanian)—thereby assuming the state-actor mantle.
The pool memorandum thus recommended denial of the certiorari
petition and offered several alternatives, including remand for

63. Id. at 1348–49.
64. Id. at 1350.
65. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988).
66. Preliminary Pool Memorandum, U.S. Supreme Court on Univ. of
Nevada v. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987) (No. 87-1061) 8 (Feb. 19, 1988),
available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunMemos/1988/GM1988-pdf/87-1061.pdf [hereinafter Tarkanian Pool Memo].
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 6.
69. 483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987); Tarkanian Pool Memo, supra note 66, at 6.
70. Tarkanian Pool Memo, supra note 66, at 8.
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reconsideration in light of San Francisco Arts.71 The Court
nonetheless chose to accept the case for review, with only four
Justices voting to grant certiorari.72 Those votes, however,
provided no hint of the likely outcome on the merits. Two of the
four Justices choosing to grant review—Rehnquist and Stevens—
would later vote to reverse the Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling,
while the other two Justices—White and O’Connor—would vote to
affirm.
In 1988, in a close 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the NCAA was not a state actor.73 The majority opinion by
Justice Stevens emphasized that the NCAA was a private
organization whose national membership was independent of any
particular state and, thus, whose policies could not be
characterized as a product of Nevada law.74
The Court
additionally ruled that promoting and administering college
athletics was not a “traditional” or “exclusive” state function and
that, while the NCAA could sanction UNLV, the NCAA could not
and did not perform the state’s function of disciplining public
employees.75 The majority opinion also disputed the claim that
UNLV had no choice but to comply with the NCAA’s
recommendations.76 It asserted that UNLV could have refused to
suspend Tarkanian, withdrawn from the NCAA, or fought as an
NCAA member to improve the Association’s rules and processes.77
Finally, the majority thought it critically important that, unlike
the relationship between Eagle Coffee Shoppe and Wilmington
Parking Authority, the NCAA and UNLV were “antagonists, not
joint participants” throughout the proceedings.78
In his dissent, Justice White came to a starkly different
conclusion, finding that the NCAA “acted jointly” with UNLV in
71. Id. at 8, 9. Ultimately, the pool memorandum advised against both
summary reversal or remand, despite concerns regarding the Nevada
Supreme Court’s treatment of the state action issue. Id. The law clerk
authoring the memorandum instead regarded “the best course” as waiting for
other courts to decide the issue to see if a split between the circuits
developed. Id. at 9.
72. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988) (mem.).
73. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
74. Id. at 193.
75. Id. at 197 n.18.
76. Id. at 198–99.
77. Id. at 198.
78. Id. at 196 n.16.
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suspending Tarkanian.79 This followed obviously and logically, he
argued, from the fact that “it was the NCAA’s findings that
Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted
hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in its membership
agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian’s
suspension by UNLV.”80 In response to the majority’s claim that
UNLV retained other choices, including withdrawing from the
NCAA, White responded that the most important fact was that
the University did not choose those options, but instead suspended
Tarkanian.81 White also observed that, while UNLV and the
NCAA may have acted as adversaries throughout the proceedings,
the bottom line, “as with any conspiracy, is that ultimately the
parties agreed to take the action.”82
One very interesting feature of the Tarkanian decision was
the unusual composition of the majority and minority coalitions.
The narrow five-member majority in Tarkanian consisted of
Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, while the dissenters included Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and O’Connor.83 As University of California, Davis Law
Professor Vikram Amar observes, this particular 5-4 line-up was
unique, never appearing in any of the other 350 cases in which
these nine Justices participated together.84
Table 2 offers
additional support, using Martin-Quinn measures of Supreme
Court ideology to demonstrate that the Justices’ votes were not
ideologically ordered;85 the majority consisted of Justices ranked
first (i.e., most conservative), second, fourth, sixth, and seventh,
while the dissenters were ranked third, fifth, eighth and ninth.
Had the votes been ideologically-ordered, a 5-4 ruling would have

79. Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id. at 202, 203.
82. Id. at 203.
83. Id. at 180 (majority opinion).
84. Vikram David Amar, The NCAA as Regulator, Litigant, and State
Actor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 415, 431 (2011).
85. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Measures, MARTIN-QUINN
SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php (last visited Jan. 21,
2015). Martin and Quinn employ a Bayesian model to generate ideal point
estimates for each Justice that are dynamic, i.e., varying for each term, and
which are derived from the Justices’ actual votes and inferred from the
patterns of voting coalitions.
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seen Justices O’Connor and White voting with the majority and
Justices Stevens and Blackmun with the dissent. Justice White’s
deviation from ideological expectations is often explained by the
fact that he was “Whizzer White,” a former college athlete who
understood the real power of the NCAA.86
Table 2: Ideological Disorder in NCAA v. Tarkanian
(1988)87

Most to
Least
Majority Minority
Conservative
1
Rehnquist
2
Scalia
3
O’Connor
4
Kennedy
5
White
6
Stevens
7
Blackmun
8
Brennan
9
Marshall
III. WHY TARKANIAN SHOULD BE REVERSED

Scholarly reaction to the Supreme Court’s Tarkanian decision
has been overwhelmingly and properly negative.88 The Court’s
86. See PORTO, supra note 55, at 134–35; see also DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON,
THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R.
WHITE 43–45 (1998).
87. Martin & Quinn, supra note 85.
88. See, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a
Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS L. 1 (2000); Betty Chang, Coercion
Theory and the State Action Doctrine as Applied in NCAA v. Tarkanian and
NCAA v. Miller, 22 J.C. & U.L. 133 (1995); Kevin M. McKenna, The
Tarkanian Decision: The State of College Athletics is Everything But State
Action, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 459 (1990); Otto & Stippich, supra note 42; John P.
Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What’s Left After National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, __ U.S. __, 109 S. Ct. 454
(1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621 (1989); Robin J. Green, Note, Does the NCAA
Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis of NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42
DUKE L.J. 99 (1992); Bill McManus, Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian: May a
Student-Athlete Receive Constitutional Protection from the NCAA’s Actions or
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adoption in the 1970s and 1980s of an increasingly formalistic and
crabbed approach to state action questions led it in Tarkanian to
ignore functional considerations in its state action analysis and
downplay compelling evidence of interdependence between the
NCAA and the state. Both factors should have led to a finding
that the NCAA’s action with respect to Coach Tarkanian was
indeed state action.
As previously noted, the Court significantly eroded its state
action rules during the mid-twentieth century, enabling the
Constitution to reach and restrict more and more private
activities, mostly in the area of race discrimination. Its primary
tool for doing so was the flexible, “totality-of-the-circumstances”
approach established in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.89 The Court explicitly rejected the idea that a simple
formula could be constructed in order to find state action.90
Instead, it claimed that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance.”91 This caseby-case and fact-based approach might be seen as a failure by the
Court to develop clear and precise doctrinal rules; to some,
however, it was an appropriate response to “the increasingly
malleable nature of public and private.”92 In the 1970s and 1980s,
the Rehnquist Court turned away from this totality-of-thecircumstances approach and returned to a “‘rule-oriented’
approach to state action analysis.”93 It “restored the doctrine’s
has the Final Door Been Closed?, 57 UMKC L. REV. 949 (1989); Potter, supra
note 57; Jose R. Riguera, Case Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian: The State Action
Doctrine Faces a Half-Court Press, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 197 (1989); Branden
Tedesco, Comment, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: A
Death Knell for the Symbiotic Relationship Test?, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
237 (1990); Stephen R. Van Camp, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Tarkanian: Viewing State Action Through the Analytical Looking Glass, 92
W. VA. L. REV. 761 (1989); Susan Westover, Note, National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Takanian: If NCAA Action is Not State Action, Can its
Members Meaningfully Air Their Dissatisfaction?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953
(1989).
89. 365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 722.
92. State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1248, 1254 (2010) [hereinafter Harvard State Action].
93. Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1391 (2005).
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formalist underpinnings,” which were firmly embraced in 1982 by
the Blum trilogy of cases.94 The modern Court’s strict, rule-bound
approach to state action, however, inhibits its ability to recognize
and appreciate the potentially varied, unusual, and cumulative
impacts of state and private entanglements.
As evidence,
remember that the Court almost did not accept the Tarkanian
case for review because of the unusual framing of the state action
question. The coach’s suspension was actually ordered by the
University, itself a state actor.95 The question in the case, thus,
became “whether UNLV’s actions in compliance with the NCAA
rules and recommendations turned the NCAA’s conduct into state
action.”96 The Court’s opinion in Tarkanian took explicit notice
that the case “uniquely mirror[ed] the traditional state-action
case” and required the Court “to step through an analytical
looking glass to resolve the case.”97 Clearly, the Court’s formalism
challenged its ability to adapt to an unusual set of facts, a blind
spot that would not have emerged under Burton’s totality-of-thecircumstances approach.98
Professor Amar has similarly criticized the Court for its rigid
and misguided search for the abstract quality of “stateness.”99 His
improved “function over form” approach invites the Court to
explore potential functional reasons for either extending or
restricting the Constitution’s reach. For example, a state action
claim might be denied for reasons relating to privacy, separation
of powers, or federalism.100 However, as Amar points out, these
functional justifications are not compelling when it comes to the
NCAA.101 A privacy rationale for rejecting state-action status, for
instance, fails because the NCAA is not an intimate or expressive
association that deserves autonomy from constitutional or
governmental regulations.102 Nor does ruling that the NCAA is a
94. Harvard State Action, supra note 92, at 1251.
95. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
96. Id. at 193.
97. Id. at 192, 193.
98. See Riguera, supra note 88, at 225, 226 n.193; see also Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961) (describing the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach).
99. Amar, supra note 84, at 416, 417–18.
100. Id. at 425.
101. Id. at 433–37.
102. Id. at 437.
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private actor appropriately leave Congress, rather than courts, in
charge of crafting fair procedures for resolving disputes; thus, a
separation-of-powers rationale also fails.103 Finally, Amar argues,
there is no compelling federalism-based reason to reject the
argument that the NCAA is a state actor.104 It makes little sense
to preserve the option of diverse state and local regulation for a
national association that designs and enforces uniform rules for
college athletics.105
The Supreme Court has, in any case,
precluded that option. Several states, including Florida, Illinois,
Nebraska, and Nevada, responded to Tarkanian by enacting laws
that imposed procedural requirements on NCAA investigations
and enforcement proceedings.106 The Court, however, refused to
review and left intact a Ninth Circuit decision holding that these
regulatory efforts ran afoul of the Constitution by unduly
burdening interstate commerce.107
Professor Amar is correct that the Court’s rigid approach to
state action deterred it in Tarkanian from exploring functional
reasons for accepting or rejecting the state action claim. Even
more significantly, in my view, the Court’s formalism blinded it to
the considerable evidence of interdependence between the NCAA
and the state.108 There is a broad array of entanglements and
mutually shared benefits between the two parties, which had led
the Court to find state action in previous cases like Burton.109
First, through its coordination and regulatory role, the NCAA
enables intercollegiate athletic competition which “generates
revenue, visibility and prestige” for its member institutions.110
The NCAA, which is based in Indianapolis, furthermore enjoys
tax-exempt status and a significant taxpayer subsidy in the form
of $1.00 annual rent in its long-term lease agreement with the
103. Id. at 434–37.
104. Id. at 433.
105. Id.
106. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 240.5339 – .5349 (West 1992); 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. §§ 25/1–13 (LexisNexis 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-1202(7) (1992);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 398.155 – .255 (1991).
107. See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1033 (1994).
108. See Potter, supra note 57, at 1286; see also Tedesco, supra note 88, at
237–38, 252, 255–56.
109. See Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 247–48.
110. Id. at 277.
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Indiana White River State Park Development Commission.111
Additionally, state and local funding supported the construction of
its new facility in Indianapolis in the 1990s.112 While there are
numerically more private than public school members in the
NCAA, public schools “dominate the funding, management and
control of the NCAA,” mostly because of their powerful presence in
Division I.113 NCAA regulations, in addition, cover a broad range
of activities at public universities and colleges, including
“recruit[ment of athletes], post-season and regular-season
[athletic] competition, academic credentials, eligibility for
financial aid . . . and promotion[]” of athletic events.114 For their
part, state schools devote considerable resources to recruit
athletes; fund, train, and promote athletic teams; pay coaches who
are often the most highly paid public employees in the state; and
construct and maintain stadiums and other athletic facilities.115
Another sizable state expense comes in the form of legal fees spent
by public institutions to defend themselves against alleged NCAA
infractions, with major violations far more likely to be imposed
against public compared to private institutions.116 This sizable
investment is necessitated by the enormous costs of NCAA
sanctions, particularly bans on post-season play.117 It is these
huge financial stakes that “make it exceedingly difficult for a
public school to honor [its] constitutional obligations when they
conflict with the NCAA’s sanctions.”118 Finally, the NCAA is
exerting more and more influence on high school athletics and
youth sports.119 This extensive and varied evidence creates a
powerful case that the NCAA and the state enjoy a symbiotic
relationship which, under a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances
approach like that employed in Burton, renders the NCAA a state

111. See id. at 276–77.
112. See id. at 277.
113. Id. at 279–82.
114. Id. at 282.
115. See id. at 286–88.
116. See id. at 285, 286; see also id. at 285 (“An analysis of the NCAA
institutions (entire membership [Divisions I, II and III]) with the most major
infractions (1953-present) [total of 269 infractions] revealed that 180(67%)
are public and 89(33%) are private.” (first alteration in original)).
117. See id. at 288–89.
118. Id. at 289.
119. Id. at 283–85.
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actor. In any case, since 1988 there has been considerable change
in the NCAA’s structure and financial status, suggesting that
courts need to provide an updated, fact-based assessment of
whether the NCAA is a state actor, instead of their private status
being “frozen in time” by Tarkanian.120
The Tarkanian Court’s formalistic blinders are also
responsible for its failure to acknowledge UNLV’s subservience to
NCAA power. The majority opinion emphasized that UNLV
retained alternatives to following the NCAA’s recommended
sanctions, such as continuing to employ Tarkanian as coach or
withdrawing from the NCAA entirely.121 The Court, furthermore,
placed great weight on the fact that UNLV and the NCAA were
antagonists throughout the lengthy investigatory and enforcement
process, claiming that this proved that they could not be
considered joint participants in Tarkanian’s suspension.122
However, the critical fact is that UNLV did choose to suspend the
coach and did so in spite of being convinced that the charges were
false.123 The fact that the University fired its coach, despite its
considerable opposition, constitutes powerful evidence that UNLV
had indeed delegated its authority to the NCAA and that the
NCAA was the master, not the servant.124 UNLV was not able, as
a practical matter, to defy or leave the NCAA because, “in the
world of intercollegiate athletics, there is but one well-kept
playing field open to colleges and universities, private or public,
and the NCAA is the groundskeeper.”125 “[T]he NCAA is, in
effect, a ‘private monopolist’ in the realm of intercollegiate
athletics.”126
To summarize, there are no compelling functional reasons to
120. See generally Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action
Doctrine’s Application to Amateur Sports, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183 (2008).
121. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988).
122. Id. at 196 n.16.
123. See James L. Arslanian, Comment, The NCAA and State Action:
Does the Creature Control Its Master?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 333, 342–43 (1990);
Tedesco, supra note 88, at 246.
124. See Arslanian, supra note 123, at 347–48, 351.
125. Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic
Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 101, 127 (1984).
126. Ronald J. Thompson, Comment, Due Process and the National
Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any Constitutional Standards?, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1651, 1664 (1994) (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198); accord
Greene, supra note 125, at 135–36.
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protect the NCAA from being considered a state actor; there are
numerous interdependencies between the state and the NCAA;
and UNLV appears to have delegated its authority to the NCAA.
The Court was, thus, incorrect in its 1988 Tarkanian ruling that
the NCAA is not a state actor.
IV. FROM “HERE TO THERE:” DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS

These weaknesses in the Court’s reasoning have been
amplified by the “unsustainable dichotomy”127 between the
Court’s Tarkanian ruling that the NCAA is not a state actor and
the Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association128 decision that a Tennessee high school athletic
association is a state actor. Not only was the outcome different in
Brentwood Academy, the Court there employed a much more
flexible and fact-based approach.129 This actually offers a path
and a rather short doctrinal step for the reversal of NCAA v.
Tarkanian.
The Brentwood Academy case began when the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”) charged the
Brentwood Academy (the “Academy”), a private Christian high
school, with violating recruiting rules and placed it on athletic
probation for four years, banned its football and basketball teams
from the playoffs for two years, and imposed a fine of $3,000.130
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that these were state actions
requiring the observance of due process safeguards because of “the
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in
[the Association’s] composition and workings.”131 In support, the
majority noted that eighty-four percent of the Association
members were public high schools; public school officials
dominated the governing council and control board; members of
the State Board of Education sat ex officio on the Association’s
governing bodies; and Association employees were permitted to
127. See Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 245.
128. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
129. Compare Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (holding that the NCAA is not a
state actor when enforcing its recruiting rules and causing the UNLV men’s
basketball coach to be fired), with Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. 288 (holding
that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association was a state actor
when attempting to enforce a rule against a member school).
130. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 293.
131. Id. at 291.
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join the state retirement system.132 Furthermore, every voting
member of the governing board that imposed penalties against
Brentwood Academy was a public school administrator.133
Interestingly, the Court claimed that the result in Brentwood was
“foreshadow[ed]” by Tarkanian,134 which had held that the
NCAA’s actions could not be fairly attributed to the state of
Nevada given the NCAA’s multi-state membership, but that it
might be different if its members, many of them public
institutions, were located within a single state.135 Perhaps it was
this distinction that prompted Justice Stevens to switch his vote
from Tarkanian and find state action in the Brentwood case.
Justice Thomas’s dissent criticized the majority for
introducing a new and uncertain state action standard, relying on
“mere ‘entwinement’” without requiring additional evidence of the
state’s joint participation, encouragement, or coercion.136 In a
particularly astute footnote, he further criticized the Court’s
reference to Tarkanian as
ironic because it is not difficult to imagine that
application of the majority’s entwinement test could
change the result reached in that case, so that the
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s actions could be
found to be state action given its large number of public
institution members that virtually control the
organization.137
Many commentators find the Brentwood Academy case
notable, first, for the majority’s use of the “entwinement” language
and, second, for its surprisingly flexible approach to the state
action issue.138 As the dissenters correctly point out, the majority
seemed to have backed away from the Court’s requirement of

132. Id. at 291–92, 300.
133. Id. at 293.
134. Id. at 297.
135. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988).
136. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 314 n.7.
138. See, e.g., Otto & Stippich supra note 42, at 270–72. This Article
views the Court’s approach in Brentwood as a move toward a more flexible
fact-based approach. See also Potter, supra note 57, at 1290–94 (focusing on
the “entwinement” analysis embraced over previously established criteria for
determining what constitutes state action in Brentwood).
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encouragement or coercion, which emerged from restrictive state
action rulings like Jackson, Blum, and Rendell-Baker.139 The
entwinement language in Brentwood, which had not been
employed since the 1966 Evans v. Newton case,140 has sparked
considerable speculation about whether it “marked a return to an
old theory of state action or the adoption of a new one.”141
Uncertainty regarding its significance in the state action field
remains.
A second noteworthy development in Brentwood is the
reemergence of a more practical and flexible approach to the state
action issue, compared to the rigid formalism the Court has
demonstrated over the last few decades. In Brentwood, Justice
Souter’s majority opinion explicitly noted that “[w]hat is fairly
attributable [to the state] is a matter of normative judgment, and
the criteria lack rigid simplicity.”142 State action is, thus, a
“necessarily fact-bound inquiry.”143 Furthermore, with regard to
Brentwood Academy, there is “no offsetting reason to see the
association’s acts in any other way” (i.e., other than as state
action) and “no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying
constitutional standards to it.”144 Another indicator of flexibility
is the Court’s treatment of the Tennessee Board of Education’s
decision to drop its 1972 rule expressly designating the
Association as “the organization to supervise and regulate the
athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high
139. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 309–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)). These
cases all strengthened the requirements for finding state action, requiring for
example that the action was traditionally an exclusive state function or was
coerced by the state. Id.
140. 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301 (1966) (holding that a private park was
municipal in character and, thus, could not discriminate based on race under
the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly where the city had previously been
significantly entwined in its management).
141. Porto, supra note 55, at 160 (discussing the uncertainty generated by
the Brentwood entwinement concept as it relates to earlier nexus and joint
participant theories of state action and its failure to make headway in
overturning Tarkanian); see also Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291, 297, 300, 302;
Evans, 382 U.S. at 299, 301.
142. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295.
143. Id. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939
(1982)).
144. Id. at 291, 298.
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schools in Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis.”145
The Court chose to look “not to form but to an underlying reality,”
sensing that “the Association’s official character” continued to
exist, even though “by winks and nods.”146
A final observation regarding the Brentwood decision is that,
unlike in Tarkanian, the Justices’ votes were perfectly ordered
ideologically. As seen in Table 3, the majority consisted of the five
least conservative Justices—Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter,
and O’Connor. The four dissenters were the most conservative
Justices—Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.
This
information suggests an ideology-based strategy for reformers
seeking to reverse Tarkanian: target the Court’s ideologicallymedian Justice and pay close attention to the ideological location
of new appointees.
Table 3: Ideological Disorder in Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
(2001)147

Most to
Least
Conservative Majority Minority
1
Thomas
2
Scalia
3
Rehnquist
4
Kennedy
5
O’Connor
6
Souter
7
Breyer
8
Ginsburg
9
Stevens
Brentwood Academy and its corresponding scholarly
commentary make clear that reversing Tarkanian would not
require the Court to invent a new doctrine or discard an entire
line of precedents and doctrinal rules. Instead, it would only need
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 292–93, 300–01.
Id. at 301 & n.4.
Martin & Quinn, supra note 85.
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to “look afresh at the NCAA, and do so in light of the Brentwood
approach,”148 seeing behind the “winks and nods” which are so
abundant “in the amateur sports context.”149 To clarify:
Given that the purpose, structure, and operations of the
NCAA and high school athletic associations are similar,
and public school members are critically involved in both
associations, there is no convincing basis to distinguish
between high school athletic associations and the NCAA
for state actor purposes. If anything, by highlighting the
nature of the relationship between the public high schools
and the TSSAA, emphasizing the money that schools
spend on competition, their need for the association, how
the association’s functions are so dependent upon public
education and the interdependence on each other,
Brentwood leads the way for a finding that the NCAA,
too, should be a state actor.150
Although reversing Tarkanian may require only a small
doctrinal step, the nudge for the Court to take that step must be
political. That is the argument that Part V seeks to develop.
V. FROM “HERE TO THERE:” POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Effective critiques and a new doctrinal path laid out in
scholarly articles may be necessary conditions for constitutional
change, but they are certainly not sufficient conditions.
Constitutional change requires a political impetus and, typically, a
strong commitment by the dominant partisan regime.
As
discussed below, this has been demonstrated in a variety of areas
of the law, including reapportionment, the Second Amendment,
and state action itself. To be successful, any reform movement to
subject the NCAA to judicial oversight must understand and
observe this lesson.

148. Potter, supra note 57, at 1294 (arguing that, in order to rein in the
NCAA, a more flexible approach, already adopted by the Court, must be
applied).
149. Koller, supra note 120, at 203 (noting that the Court’s refusal in
Brentwood to ignore the state’s action through the TSSAA, even though not
as overt as it was in the past, could hold serious implications in the world of
amateur sports where the same pattern is so common).
150. Otto & Stippich, supra note 42, at 274.
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A. Reapportionment.
In 1962, the Supreme Court entered what Justice Frankfurter
called “the political thicket” of reapportionment.151 It ruled in
Baker v. Carr that the severe malapportionment existing in the
House of Representatives and virtually every state legislature—
typically
overrepresentation
of
rural
residents
and
underrepresentation of urban residents—was a justiciable issue
that could be addressed by federal courts.152 With this green
light, federal court judges began entertaining and deciding
constitutional challenges to malapportioned legislative bodies.
Within two years, the Court imposed a strict one person-one vote
equality standard on the U.S. House of Representatives and every
state legislative chamber.153 Remarkably, by 1970 all states had
complied with the Court’s new equal population standard in its
congressional districts and in both state houses, and
representational equality dramatically improved.154
151. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“In effect, today’s decision empowers the courts of the country to
devise what should constitute the proper composition of the legislatures of
the fifty states.”); see also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)
(dismissing a suit by Illinois voters seeking a declaration that an Illinois
statute apportioning congressional districts resulted in unequal
representation of their districts and was, therefore, unconstitutional, Justice
Frankfurter advised that “Courts ought not enter this political thicket”).
152. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209–10; see also STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES
M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (2008) (recognizing that in 1960,
the most overrepresented county in a typical state enjoyed thirty-five times
as much representation as the underrepresented county); see also Mathew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy:
Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 390–91
(1988) (“In the 88th Congress (1962) only nine districts were within 1 percent
of the average size in their states.”).
153. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 577 (1964) (“By holding that
as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that a state make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–9, 18 (1964) (“While it may
not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision,
that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making
equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal of the
House of Representatives.”).
154. See James B. Cottrill & Terri J. Peretti, Gerrymandering from the
Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting, 12 ELECTION L.
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While the Court is typically and understandably praised for
advancing democratic values with these extraordinary decisions,
the motivation behind them was largely partisan.155 As I have
argued elsewhere, it was not the Court’s desire to promote equal
representation that explains why the Baker ruling materialized in
1962 instead of 1952, 1942, or 1932, when severe
malapportionment also existed.156 The timing of the Court’s
intervention in the redistricting field and the strictly egalitarian
nature of that intervention make sense, however, when a regimepolitics lens is employed.
A regime-politics perspective places constitutional change in a
larger political context, recognizing that it is often the result of a
coordinated, inter-branch partisan campaign.157 The Court’s
reapportionment revolution, according to this view, resulted
generally from the electoral success of the Democratic Party and
more specifically from the efforts of the Kennedy
Administration.158
Democrats dominated presidential and
congressional elections from 1932 through 1966 and, over those
three-and-a half decades, controlled the White House nearly

J. 261, 261–76 (2013); see also ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 152, at
95.
155. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 77–88, 116–25 (1980). In the former section, Ely discusses
the democratic principles embodied in the Constitution and the importance of
representation in the functioning of those principles. In the latter section, he
addresses the importance of the Court’s role in the reapportionment cases in
advancing the democratic principles previously discussed. See also JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 126 (2006).
156. Terri Peretti, Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review and the
Challenge of Partisan Polarization, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 843, 854–55 (2014)
(adapting Cass Sunstein’s question regarding why the Supreme Court
recognized an individual right to gun ownership under the Second
Amendment “in 2008, rather than 1958, 1968, 1978 or 1998,” in order to
discuss the reapportionment cases from a regime politics perspective); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold,
122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 247 (2008)); see also ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra
note 152, at 25–34.
157. See generally Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993);
see also Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political
Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme
Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 585–96 (2005).
158. See Peretti, supra note 156, at 855–56.
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eighty percent of the time159 and Congress ninety percent of the
time.160 This translated directly into Democratic control of federal
judicial appointments. Especially significant in terms of its
ideological impact on the Supreme Court, in 1962 President
Kennedy replaced Justice Whittaker with Justice White and
Justice Frankfurter with Justice Goldberg, which shifted the
Court dramatically to the left.161
Also relevant was John
Kennedy’s campaign theme, both as a senator and a presidential
candidate, regarding “the crisis of the cities,” which resulted, he
said, from “political discrimination” against the urban majority.
This campaign continued after Kennedy arrived in the White
House, including Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Deputy
Attorney General Byron White choosing to meet with the Baker
attorneys and deciding to file an amicus brief in the case.162 The
Administration continued to file briefs in the redistricting cases
that followed and praised the Court for the favorable (i.e., liberal)
decisions that resulted.163 Additionally, the Court’s intervention,
combined with the largely Democratic composition of the federal
bench in the 1960s, had a strong partisan impact, eliminating a
longstanding Republican representational bias outside of the
South.164 As explained by Cox and Katz, the Supreme Court
159. See The Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
1600/presidents (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
160.
See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/PartyDivisions/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2014); Party Division in the Senate, 1789Present,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
161. The percentage of conservative Court decisions fell from 42 percent
in the 1960 term to 22 percent in the 1962 term, according to data from The
Supreme Court Database. See Analysis Specifications, SUPREME COURT
DATABASE, http://www.scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (last visited Jan. 21,
2015). Using Martin-Quinn ideology scores—in which positive numbers
indicate a conservative orientation and negative numbers indicate a liberal
orientation—the median Justice on the Court changed from Justice Stewart
in the 1960 term (with an ideology score of 0.533), to Justice White in the
1961 term (-0.046), to Justice Goldberg in the 1962 term (-0.808), to Justice
Brennan in the 1963 term (-0.874). See Martin & Quinn, supra note 85.
162. See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 152, at 1, 4.
163. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus at 15–16, Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (No. 69), 1963 WL 106063.
164. See generally GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT
REVOLUTION (2002).
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altered the redistricting game, with rural state legislators no
longer able to refuse to redistrict or to favor their own interests
when doing so because there was a federal judge—in all
likelihood, a Democratic federal judge—who could and did impose
his or her own plan.165
The key point is that the Supreme Court did not just
neutrally advance democratic values with its reapportionment
decisions. The impetus for this doctrinal revolution was partisan.
The Court in the 1960s was part of the Kennedy-Johnson
Democratic regime, and it predictably advanced egalitarian values
in a variety of doctrinal areas, including reapportionment. The
Court’s Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v.
Sims166 decisions unsurprisingly helped the Democratic Party’s
urban, minority constituency, as well as Democratic politicians
who had long suffered under rural, conservative domination in the
legislatures. The Court, in other words, advanced not just
democratic values, but a Democratic agenda. It was a partisan
campaign, rather than a commitment to constitutional principles
or democratic values, that transformed this field of constitutional
law.
B. The Second Amendment.
This lesson of the preeminent role of partisan politics in
constitutional development is also evident in the Second
Amendment doctrinal area.
The Supreme Court barely
acknowledged the Second Amendment throughout the nineteenth
and most of the twentieth century, and constitutional law
casebooks rarely discussed it. Yet the Court declared a robust
individual right to gun ownership in the 2008 District of Columbia
v. Heller case.167 This profound constitutional change, like that in
the reapportionment field, was politically-driven. Playing a key
role in this particular constitutional revolution was a “powerful
and aggressive social movement promoting public and judicial
recognition of an individual right to have guns for nonmilitary
purposes.”168 Its remarkable success is seen in the existence
165. Id.
166. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
167. 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008).
168. Sunstein, supra note 156, at 252.
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today of sizable majorities supporting gun rights169 and the
commitments expressed in both the Democratic and Republican
national platforms to a Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.170
When it comes to the Court adopting a new position on the
Second Amendment, two developments are especially noteworthy.
First is the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) organized
“campaign” in the last few decades of the twentieth century “to
develop a large body of literature supporting the individual right
position and to create a perception that this view constitutes a
standard model of scholarship.”171 The NRA’s efforts included
distributing money to “friendly scholars,” launching an annual
“Stand Up for the Second Amendment” essay contest (with a
$25,000 prize), and funding a new organization called Academics
for the Second Amendment that filed amicus briefs advancing the
so-called standard model.172 These efforts paid off, with the
number of law review articles advocating the individual right
position growing from three in the 1960s to twenty-seven in the

169. In a February 2008 USA Today/Gallup poll, seventy-three percent of
Americans expressed the belief that the Second Amendment guarantees the
rights of individuals, rather than members of state militias, to own guns, and
nearly seventy percent of Americans opposed handgun bans. Jeffrey M.
Jones, Americans in Agreement With Supreme Court on Gun Rights, GALLUP
(Jun. 26, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108394/americans-agreementsupreme-court-gun-rights.aspx. In a 2013 Rasmussen poll, nearly two-thirds
of Americans believed that “the purpose of the Second Amendment is to make
sure that people are able to protect themselves from tyranny.” 65% See Gun
Rights As Protection Against Tyranny, RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/gun
_control/65_see_gun_rights_as_protection_against_tyranny.
170. The 2012 Republican National Platform states, “[w]e uphold the
right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a right which antedated the
Constitution and was solemnly confirmed by the Second Amendment.” GOV.
BOB MCDONNELL ET AL., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 20 (2012), available at
https://cdn.gop.com/docs/2012GOPPlatform.pdf.
The 2012 Democratic
National Platform states, “[w]e recognize that the individual right to bear
arms is an important part of the American tradition, and we will preserve
Americans’ Second Amendment right to own and use firearms.” DEMOCRATIC
PLATFORM 18 (2012), available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012National-Platform.pdf.
171. Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment
Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 24 (2000).
172. See id. at 14.
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1970s and 1980s to fifty-eight in the 1990s.173 Although both
Scalia’s majority opinion and Stevens’s dissenting opinion in
Heller examined the history of the Second Amendment, Scalia’s
opinion asserting the individual right view relied more heavily on
law review articles written by law professors, rather than those
authored by trained historians.174
Providing a significant boost to the NRA’s efforts was the
electoral success of the Republican Party, which won five of the
seven presidential elections from 1980 to 2004. Executive branch
support for gun rights followed, as “[p]rominent Justice
Department officials in the Reagan, first Bush, and second Bush
administrations publicly supported the individual rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment and aggressively took
steps to make their position the constitutional law of the land.”175
This included vigorous support for an originalist interpretive
approach that the Heller Court thoroughly embraced, Attorney
General John Ashcroft committing George W. Bush’s
administration to the individual right of gun ownership in a public
letter to the NRA in 2001,176 and an amicus brief in Heller
advancing the individual right view of the Second Amendment.177
Republican appointments to the Supreme Court helped ensure
that those arguments would be given a receptive hearing. It is no
surprise that each member of the Heller majority—Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito—was a Republican
appointed by a Republican president.178 Like Baker, Heller
173. See id. at 14–15. In contrast, the number of law review articles
supporting the collective right model remained relatively static at eleven in
the 1960s, twenty-two in the 1970s and 1980s, and twenty-nine in the 1990s.
See id.
174. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–86 (2008),
with id. at 640–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 924–25
(2013).
176. Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S., to James J.
Baker, Executive Director, National Rifle Ass’n (May 17, 2001), available at
http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf.
177. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of the Department of
Justice in Support of Respondent, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL
405551.
178. In all fairness, two of the dissenting Justices—Stevens and Souter—
were also Republicans appointed by Republican presidents. Of course, they
are also seen by the Republican Party faithful as “presidential mistakes”
when it comes to Supreme Court appointments. See Presidents sometimes
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represents the “triumph of politics”179 and another example of the
partisan orchestration of doctrinal change.
C. State Action.
Doctrinal developments in the state action field during the
twentieth century provide a final lesson of how partisan regimes
construct constitutional law. The liberalization of state action
rules in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s was engineered by leaders in
the Democratic Party,180 while its retrenchment in the several
decades that followed can be credited to Republican Party
elites.181
Democratic leaders in the executive branch in the midtwentieth century encouraged the Supreme Court to adopt an
expansive interpretation of state action rules in order to ban
private race discrimination that a Southern-dominated Congress
would not address.182 They did so through Supreme Court
appointments and Justice Department litigation strategies that
sought to broaden state action in areas perceived to be most
important such as voting, housing, and public accommodations.183
Court victories like Smith v. Allwright, Shelley v. Kraemer, and
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority then followed, along with
enhanced judicial support for congressional efforts to battle
private race discrimination.184 Because the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibited a variety of forms of private race discrimination,185
state action cases involving race largely disappeared from the
federal court docket—along with pressure on the Court to stretch
state action rules. Unsurprisingly, the Court returned to a more
modest view of state action.
Reinforcing that trend was the ascendance of “the new right
Republican regime.”186
Republican victories in five of six
regret justices they appoint, USA TODAY (July 4, 2005), http://usa
today30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-07-04-defiant-justices_x.htm.
179. Sunstein, supra note 156, at 273.
180. See Peretti, supra note 27, at 277–78.
181. See id. at 288–89.
182. See id. at 290–98.
183. See id.
184. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Heart of Atl.
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 270 (1964).
185.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
186. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Political
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presidential elections from 1968 to 1988 produced eleven
consecutive
Supreme
Court
appointment
opportunities.
Remarkably, nearly three-quarters of those GOP-controlled
vacancies were “distal” in which the departing Justice resides at
or on the opposite side of the Court median from the president;187
it is precisely (and only) these types of vacancies that allow the
president to “move the Court median” and alter Supreme Court
ideology.188 In addition to their transformative Supreme Court
appointments, Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan both
campaigned against liberal judicial activism, arguing that
unelected judges had seized power from elected officials—with
Nixon pointing to Court decisions regarding school desegregation
and law and order189 and Reagan emphasizing abortion and
school prayer.190 Justice Department officials additionally gave
speeches and published position papers advancing those
conservative constitutional commitments.191 The Reagan Justice
Department’s Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation, for
example, advised government litigators on the use of originalism
to reverse precedents involving, not only school prayer, the
exclusionary rule, and abortion, but also the incorporation
doctrine, a broad interpretation of congressional enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and an
Determinants of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence: How
the New Right Regime Has Shaped the Rehnquist Court, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385,
1394 (2006).
187. According to my analysis, eight of the eleven vacancies occurring
from 1969 to 1992 were “distal” (Warren, Fortas, Black, Harlan, Douglas,
Powell, Brennan, and Marshall), while three were “proximal” (Stewart,
Burger, Rehnquist). See Terri Peretti, Distal Vacancies, Partisan Regimes,
and Supreme Court Ideology (Apr. 21–23, 2011) (prepared for Annual
Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Antonio, TX) (on
file with author).
188. Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median
Game, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 231 (2007).
189. See generally KEVIN MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT (2011).
190. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 175, at 737–43.
191. See AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES (2015);
MCMAHON, supra note 189; STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE
LEGAL MOVEMENT (2010); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988); OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000:
CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988); Edwin Meese III,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7
(1988).
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expansive state action doctrine.192 Although this campaign was
not always successful, the Republican regime made significant
headway in altering constitutional law in a variety of doctrinal
areas, including state action.
Both the rise and the fall of the state action doctrine were
engineered by partisan elites. The lesson once again is that
constitutional change requires more than the presence of effective
scholarly critiques and a credible doctrinal alternative; it requires
the support of an electorally-successful partisan movement. Those
seeking to reverse Tarkanian must learn this lesson and gain
partisan support for their reform agenda.
VI. FROM “HERE TO THERE:” STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Creating a new constitutional rule or reversing a
longstanding precedent sometimes requires an enormous step, a
challenge given that the Court is more inclined to move
incrementally than in large leaps and bounds. When it comes to
reversing Tarkanian, however, the doctrinal step is quite small
and potential paths for that step have already been laid out by
legal scholars and by the Court itself in Brentwood Academy. The
entwinement standard and the willingness to look beyond
formalities and “winks and nods” could enable the Court to see the
numerous financial linkages and dependencies between the NCAA
and the state and recognize the truly monopolistic and coercive
nature of NCAA power. Like in Brentwood, the Court can also ask
whether, on balance, it is unreasonable or unfair to ask that the
NCAA observe constitutional standards.
Reversal appears to be a small step, not only doctrinally, but
also in terms of votes. The Court has been closely divided on the
question of whether amateur athletic associations are state actors,
with both Tarkanian and Brentwood Academy being decided by a
single vote and votes in the latter case also being ideologicallyordered. In counting potential votes for reversal, it should be
noted that Scalia and Kennedy, the only two remaining Tarkanian
Justices, voted against the state action claims in both Tarkanian
and Brentwood Academy and are unlikely sources.193 Justice
192. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 175, at 748–52.
193. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.
288, 305 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J.,
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Thomas dissented in Brentwood Academy, preferring to rule that
the TSSAA was not a state actor and further expressing in a
footnote his disagreement with the implications of the
entwinement standard: a reversal of Tarkanian and a new finding
that the NCAA is a state actor.194 A reasonable expectation is
that the other two conservative Justices currently on the Court
and to the right of Kennedy—Roberts and Alito—would also reject
state actor status for the NCAA. It is probable, though not
certain, that all four Democratic Justices would disagree and vote
to reverse Tarkanian; after all, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
voted with the Brentwood majority and Sotomayor and Kagan lie
ideologically between the two.195 This informal head count and
best-case scenario for reformers suggest at least a one-vote deficit.
Securing one additional vote sounds deceptively simple. It
would in fact require a vote switch from Scalia, Kennedy, or
Thomas; ideologically-unexpected votes from Roberts or Alito; or
the replacement of a conservative Justice with a liberal Justice.
The latter option, moreover, involves two steps—a conservative
Justice departing from the Court while a Democrat occupies the
White House. While certainly possible, it is less likely to the
degree that modern Justices engage in strategic retirement.196
Because the Democratic Party has historically been, and will
probably continue to be, the most likely supporter of an expansive

& Kennedy, J.); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
194. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 935 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. See Current Beliefs, SUP CT. IDEOLOGY PROJECT, http://sct.tahk.us/
current.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
196. Although anecdotal evidence supports the claim that Supreme Court
Justices time their retirements strategically—for example when a co-partisan
president is in office—systematic empirical evidence is mixed. Compare
Timothy M. Hagle, Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on
the United States Supreme Court, 15 POL. BEHAV. 25 (1993) (confirming
strategic retirement); Kjersten R. Nelson & Eve M. Ringsmuth, Departures
from the Court: The Political Landscape and Institutional Constraints, 37 AM.
POL. RES. 486 (2009) (same); Ross M. Stolzenberg & James Lindgren,
Retirement and Death in Office of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 47
DEMOGRAPHY 269 (2010) (same), with Terri Peretti & Alan Rozzi, Modern
Departures from the U.S. Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power? 30
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 131 (2011) (rejecting strategic retirement); Albert Yoon,
Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal
Judges, 1869-2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 (2006) (same); Christopher J.
W. Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks Model of Supreme
Court Vacancies, 1789-1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145 (2000) (same).

PERETTIFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

HERE, THERE, AND BEYOND

3/27/2015 11:30 AM

329

state action doctrine under which Tarkanian would be reversed,
the wisest strategy for reversal, to put it simply and bluntly, is to
elect more Democrats. When the White House and Senate are
controlled by the Democratic Party, courts move in a liberal
direction, and conservative precedents like Tarkanian are more
likely to fall.197
In terms of a more specific litigation strategy, the history of
state action rulings is instructive. The Court has been much more
likely in the past to accept state action claims that involve race,198
suggesting that litigators would be wise to emphasize the racial
angle where possible. In fact, it is not difficult to demonstrate
that NCAA policies and enforcement actions often have a
disparate racial impact. Eligibility rules based on grades and
entrance examinations disproportionately exclude African
American athletes from participation and have been labeled as
“patently racist.”199 Its rules enforcing amateurism also are more
likely to harm economically disadvantaged athletes who are
disproportionately African American.200 A recent example is the
case of basketball player Ben McLemore, whose partial academic
disqualification by the NCAA in his first year at the University of
Kansas delayed his entry into the NBA and ensured that his
family would have to suffer another year of devastating
poverty.201 Selective and uneven enforcement of NCAA rules is
197. This scenario could also be aided by the appointment to the Supreme
Court of Sri Srinivasan, placed on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by
President Obama. He is the first federal appellate judge of South Asian
descent and is often touted as a likely Supreme Court nominee. See Richard
Wolf, Sri Srinivansan: Supreme Court Justice in the Making?, USA TODAY
(May 23, 2013, 6:53pm), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/05/23/srisrinivasan-judge-supreme-court-circuit-dc-obama-bush/2351543/.
Judge
Srinivasan could be another vote for Tarkanian’s reversal, given his fanatical
support for the University of Kansas men’s basketball team.
198. See Peretti, supra note 27.
199. Greene, supra note 125, at 104; DelGreco K. Wilson, Black Athletes,
Race and the Rise of NCAA Eligibility Requirements, THE BLACK CAGER (Sept.
18, 2014), http://delgrecowilson.com/2014/09/18/black-athletes-race-and-therise-of-ncaa-eligibility-requirements/.
200. See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, Race And the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2012, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/opinion/nocerarace-and-the-ncaa.html?_r=0.
201. See Eric Prisbell, Kansas’ Ben McLemore Fights Through Poverty to
NCAA’s Center Stage, USA TODAY (June 21, 2013, 3:39am), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/big12/2013/02/27/big-12-mens-college-basket
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another potential source of race discrimination claims.202
A final factor that could aid Tarkanian’s reversal is the
increasingly hostile environment in which the NCAA finds
itself.203 In the past, the NCAA enjoyed a glow of deference and
good will, which has helped it in its dealings with Congress and
the courts, and both have been quite kind to the NCAA. The
courts have shielded the NCAA from both constitutional
constraints and state regulation, and its Tarkanian ruling seems
“frozen in time.”204 The NCAA has been the subject of numerous
congressional hearings, including a dozen formal hearings over
the last decade, but none thus far have produced any formal
legislative action.205
Recent years have seen an increase,
however, in both the negative tone of those hearings and the
presence of opposition from both sides of the aisle. Examples
abounded at the Senate Commerce Committee hearing held on
July 9, 2014.206 Especially striking were statements by Senators
Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and Dean Heller (R-NV), challenging the
very existence of the NCAA and questioning why it should not be
disbanded.207 Furthermore, a number of bipartisan bills have
been introduced, such as the NCAA Accountability Act that would
guarantee four-year athletic scholarships, require annual baseline
concussion tests, permit universities to pay stipends to their
ball-kansas-jayhawks-ben-mclemore/1947401/.
202. See Nocera, supra note 200.
203. See Branch, supra note 41; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, The College Sports
Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/nocera-the-college-sports-cartel.html;
Joe
Nocera, Op-Ed, The N.C.A.A.’s Ethics Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013, at
A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/opinion/nocera-thencaas-ethics-problem.html; Nocera, supra note 5; Nocera, supra note 5;
Norman Ornstein, Why Hasn’t Congress Investigated Corruption in the
NCAA?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2014, 12:05pm), http://www.theatlantic.com/
entertainment/archive/2014/04/why-hasn’t-congress-investigated-corruption-i
n-the-ncaa/360391/.
204. Koller, supra note 120, at 183.
205. See, e.g., Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the
Consequences of Unionizing Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Educ. &
the Workforce Comm., 113th Cong. (2014); Promoting the Well-Being and
Academic Success of College Athletes: Hearing Before U.S. S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Well-Being
Hearing].
206. Well-Being Hearing, supra note 205.
207. Id. (statements of Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO) & Sen. Dean Heller
(R-NV)).
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athletes, and mandate due process protections prior to the
imposition of NCAA sanctions.208 While there is currently little
optimism regarding the passage of such bills, the threat of
legislation on this and a range of other important NCAA matters,
including anti-trust and tax exemptions, may prompt the
Association to act in order to avoid congressional intervention, as
it did after a 1978 Senate report that recommended federal
regulation of the NCAA’s enforcement procedures.209
Greater media scrutiny and harsh press reports in recent
years are also contributing to the NCAA’s increasingly tarnished
image.210 This loss of credibility is important as it enhances the
possibility of unfriendly government action. Much of the recent
negative press has focused on multiple lawsuits that have been
filed against the NCAA,211 including a class action suit by Jeff
Kessler on behalf of college athletes alleging that the NCAA and

208. H.R.J. Res. 2903, 113th Cong. (2013).
209. The NCAA amended its enforcement processes after the Senate held
hearings and published its report, S. REP. 95-69 (1978), suggesting future
federal regulation. See NATHAN BROOKS, THE NCAA AND DUE PROCESS: LEGAL
ISSUES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2004), available at http://
congressionalresearch.com/RL32529/document.php?study=The+NCAA+and+
Due+Process+Legal+Issues.
210. See, e.g., Branch, supra note 41; see also supra note 203.
211. See, e.g., Dennis Dodd, Potential landmark cases make these perilous
times for the NCAA, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:44am),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/21563406/potential-landmarkcasesmake-theseperiloustimes-for-the-ncaa; Nathan Fenno, New lawsuit
targets NCAA, 11 conferences over scholarships, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014,
4:23 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-lawsuit-targetsncaa-scholarships-20140425-story.html; Sara Ganim, ‘Amateurism is a myth’:
Athletes file class-action against NCAA,” CNN (Apr. 5, 2014, 2:35 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/17/justice/ncaa-student-athletes-paymentlawsuit/; George, supra note 44; Peter Hall, Judge: Paterno suit targeting
Penn State sanctions can move toward trial, MORNING CALL (Sept. 11, 2014,
8:14 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-penn-state-paterno-ncaalawsuit-advances-20140911-story.html; Jerry Hinnen, Labor attorney Jeffrey
Kessler files antitrust lawsuit vs. NCAA, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:42
AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/24488
838/labor-attorney-jeffrey-kessler-files-antitrust-lawsuit-vs-ncaa;
John
Keilman, NCAA reaches $75 million settlement in concussion lawsuit, CHI.
TRIBUNE (July 29, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/breaking/chi-ncaa-reaches_75-million-settlement-in-concussion-la
wsuit-20140729-story.html; Joe Nocera, The Lawsuit and the N.C.A.A., N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
06/22/opinion/nocera-the-lawsuit-and-the-ncaa.html; Nocera, supra note 3.
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the five major athletic conferences constitute a cartel.212 Each
lawsuit inspires another, which inspires another, which increases
the appearance of NCAA vulnerability. Especially significant, the
lawsuits provide courts with more opportunities to evaluate NCAA
policies and practices. One or more of these cases could make
their way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
All of these factors—a more Democratic federal bench, the
strategic selection of cases raising race-related claims, growing
congressional hostility, multiple lawsuits against the NCAA,
mounting media criticism, and an increasingly negative public
image for the NCAA—all lend themselves to Tarkanian’s reversal.
It is not unreasonable to believe that NCAA enforcement actions
could be subjected to judicial review in the not so distant future.
VII. “AND BEYOND:” THE CONSEQUENCES OF REVERSING TARKANIAN

Reversing Tarkanian opens the door to judicial oversight of
the NCAA. State actor status for the NCAA brings judges into its
investigatory and enforcement processes and alters the power
relationships among the key players. This is precisely what
happened in the reapportionment field once judicial intervention
was permitted. After 1962, state legislators were no longer free to
do whatever they wanted when it came to redistricting. Federal
judges were guaranteed a seat at the redistricting table and were
empowered to assert constitutional interests, particularly those of
underrepresented urban minorities.213
With Tarkanian’s
reversal, federal judges would similarly be empowered. They
could assess the substantive and procedural fairness of NCAA
policies and practices and protect the liberty and property
interests of college athletes, coaches, and member institutions.
The NCAA would be forced to become more attentive to those
interests and would need to reform “the arbitrary and opaque
enforcement process [it] currently utilize[s].”214
It is well-known that government agencies are most effective
and responsive when their clients are well-organized and
212. See Jon Solomon, Meet Jeffrey Kessler, lawyer whose suit strikes fear
in NCAA’s heart, CBS Sports (Nov. 4, 2014, 1:26 PM), http://www.
cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24783680/meet-jeffrey-kessle
r-lawyer-whose-suit-strikes-fear-in-ncaas-heart.
213. See generally COX & KATZ, supra note 164.
214. Fogarty, supra note 5.
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powerful. A classic example is the Social Security Administration,
whose effectiveness is in large part a product of the political power
of its clientele. The elderly vote at very high rates, their interests
are well-represented by the American Association of Retired
Persons, and members of Congress ensure that Social Security
benefits are both generous and effectively administered.215 The
Federal Aviation Administration and the Securities and Exchange
Commission are also regarded as effective government agencies,
which is similarly a result of their well-organized and influential
clientele—the airline industry and the securities industry,
respectively.216
The inverse relationship holds as well:
organizations serving a weak clientele are more prone to
corruption, incompetence, and abuse of power. Such imbalances of
power are readily apparent, for example, with welfare agencies in
relation to welfare recipients, prison officials in relation to
prisoners, and law enforcement agencies in relation to criminal
suspects. It is no surprise that the clients of these agencies have
had to turn to the courts for the protection of their rights.217
When it comes to college athletes, they too have been poorlyorganized and weak in relation to the NCAA. They have had to
accept scholarships that were not guaranteed beyond a single
year, a persistent gap between the scholarship amount and the
true cost of their college education, and few procedural protections
when the NCAA investigates potential rule violations and imposes
sanctions. The University, in theory, could act as an effective
counter-weight to NCAA power, but its tremendous financial
215. See Naureen Khan, Is the AARP the ‘900-pound invisible gorilla’ in
the room, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 22, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/22/is-the-aarp-the-900poundinvisiblego
rillaintheroom.html.
216. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory
Capture, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 11, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture/?
_r=0. Of course, responsiveness sometimes goes too far in the form of “agency
capture” in which the agency is captured by the interests it is supposed to
regulate instead of advancing broader public interests. See generally HUGH
HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS (1977); George Stigler, The theory of
economic regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
217. The Supreme Court has acted to protect the due process rights of
welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), prisoners in
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and probationers and parolees in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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interests do not always coincide with the needs of athletes and
coaches. A declaration by the Supreme Court that the NCAA is a
state actor will give legal standing to athletes and coaches to
assert constitutional claims against the Association. Judges can
explore what due process requires when the liberty and property
interests of athletes and coaches are harmed by NCAA
enforcement actions. Judges might decide that the NCAA must
provide parties with the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. Judges might decide that the NCAA cannot serve
simultaneously as an investigator, prosecutor, and judge and that
athletes and coaches accused of wrong-dong must be provided with
a neutral, third-party decision maker. These are desirable
changes from the longstanding practice in which “only the NCAA’s
own version of due process . . . constrain[s] it.”218
By reversing NCAA v. Tarkanian and treating the NCAA as a
state actor, the Association would be held to constitutional
requirements, such as due process of law. Judicial oversight of
NCAA enforcement proceedings would promote basic fairness to
those individuals and institutions whose interests can be so
greatly harmed. As the Supreme Court said in Brentwood
Academy, that is not unreasonable.

218.

PORTO, supra note 55, at 161.

